EM SAQs · Medical error and patient safety
The ten-fold overdose — error, disclosure, reporting and just culture
An ACEM-style SAQ on the immediate management of a medication error, open disclosure, incident reporting, root cause analysis and just culture.
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Immediate clinical management — treat the patient first. Recognise opioid toxicity from the ten-fold morphine overdose: respiratory rate 6 and saturation 88 per cent are life-threatening respiratory depression. Give high-flow oxygen and naloxone 0.4 mg intravenously, starting from a modest dose and carefully titrating to restore respiratory rate and arousal without precipitating severe withdrawal or pain. Reassess continuously; because morphine outlasts naloxone, observe for re-sedation over several hours and prepare a naloxone infusion if needed. Confirm the airway and breathing, apply cardiac and saturation monitoring, and document the time of the overdose, the assessment, the naloxone dose and the response contemporaneously and factually in the record.[4]
Preserve the record and escalate. The record is never altered, deleted or back-dated; it is documented factually without speculation or attribution of fault, and a clearly marked late addendum may be added if needed. The error, the clinical response and the escalation are entered as they occur. The retained ampoule supports the later investigation.[1]
[1]Open disclosure — begin promptly, lead it yourself. Once the patient is stable, conduct an initial disclosure conversation within 24 hours in a private setting, with the patient and his family and the consultant present. Acknowledge factually what happened — a ten-fold morphine dose was given in error and required reversal. Offer a sincere apology; an apology is protected and is not an admission of legal liability. Gallagher established that patients wanted disclosure of all harmful errors, and Kachalia showed that disclosure programmes can coexist with liability containment. Explain the clinical consequences, what was done to treat them, and the plan. Commit to a formal follow-up meeting once the investigation is complete, name a single point of contact, and document the conversation.[2][3]
Incident reporting — what, when, how. File an incident report within the shift, via the local incident-management system, recording the facts (not attribution of blame). The event is a near miss-turned-harm event — a ten-fold dosing error with respiratory depression reversed — and is reportable because it reached the patient and caused harm. The report routes the event for departmental review and triggers the formal investigation.[1]
[2]Root cause analysis — ask why, not who. A structured, retrospective investigation follows the sentinel or serious-harm event. Charter a multidisciplinary team led independently of the event, lay out the timeline of what happened versus what should have happened, then apply the five-whys to drill from the active failure (the resident drew up the wrong dose) toward the latent causes — the interrupted drug preparation, the adjacent look-alike morphine ampoules, the absent forcing function in the prescribing software, the production pressure. Phrase each causal statement as cause-and-effect and design corrective actions by the hierarchy of controls: a forcing function or ceiling-dose alert is strong, simplification and standardisation are medium, and an in-service or poster is weakest. Each action needs a named owner, a deadline and a measure of success, with follow-up to confirm the fix held.[1]
Just culture and the second victim — judge the behaviour, not the outcome. Apply the just-culture test: culpability turns on the conduct and the foreseeable risk, not on the fact that harm occurred. If the resident, working in good faith, made a slip or lapse in a system that made the error easy and its detection hard, the response is consolation, support and system redesign — not sanction. If the conduct was at-risk (a knowing shortcut), coach it back to the safe path; only truly reckless conduct warrants discipline. Simultaneously support the resident as a second victim: the clinician involved in harm is at high risk of guilt, self-doubt and burnout, and a named peer supporter and a just-culture response reduce severity and support return to practice.[1]
References5ShowHide
- [1]Makary MA, Daniel M. Medical error-the third leading cause of death in the US. BMJ (Clinical research ed.), 2016.PMID 27143499
- [2]Gallagher TH, Waterman AD, Ebers AG, Fraser VJ, Levinson W. Patients' and physicians' attitudes regarding the disclosure of medical errors. JAMA, 2003.PMID 12597752
- [3]Kachalia A, Sands K, Niel MV, et al. Effects Of A Communication-And-Resolution Program On Hospitals' Malpractice Claims And Costs. Health Affairs (Project Hope), 2018.PMID 30395501
- [4]Gonzalez Utrilla M, et al. Naloxone dosing in the era of synthetic opioids: Applying the Goldilocks principle. Addiction, 2025.PMID 40197810
- [5]Ong TSK, Goh CN, Tan EKYE, et al. Second Victim Syndrome Among Healthcare Professionals: A Systematic Review of Interventions and Outcomes. Journal of Healthcare Leadership, 2025.PMID 40485771