Philosophy of mind, multilevel explanation, and capacity (MEQ)

(i) Definitions. Philosophy of mind asks what mental states are and how they relate to brain/body/world. Descriptive psychopathology names the form of experience and behaviour with clinical language before causal theory or diagnosis. Use form first, then philosophy-informed explanation.^[3]

(ii) Stances. Substance dualism: mind and body as distinct substances. Physicalism: mental depends on or is physical. Functionalism: mental states defined by causal roles, not by 'stuff.' Clinical pay-off: avoid 'only weak-minded or only chemical' forced choice.^[3]

(iii) Kendler. Prefer explanatory pluralism across levels (molecular to social) with only patchy reduction; causes of psychiatric illness are dappled — many kinds, not a clean organic-functional or hardware-software split. Each hypothesis must live at a named level with appropriate evidence.^[3][4]

(iv) BPS. Engel challenged narrow biomedicine to include biological, psychological, and social data in clinical method. Ghaemi: the label often became empty eclectic checklists. Rescue: prioritised, testable multilevel hypotheses (not three blank boxes).^[1][2]

(v) Free will and capacity. Neuroscience of volition is frequently over-read; a scan does not abolish responsibility frameworks or duty of care. Teach careful separation of causal explanation from legal/moral responsibility talk. If consent contested: assess understanding, appreciation, reasoning, and communicating a choice — decision-specific, not identical to insight or to free-will metaphysics. Do not invent statute numbers.^[5][6]